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Identifying Chemical Hazards for
Regulation: The Scientific Basis and

Regulatory Scope of California's
Proposition 65 List of Carcinogens and
Reproductive Toxicants
William S. Pease*
Introduction
California's Proposition 65, the Safe Drinking Water: and Toxic
Enforcement Act of 1986,1 has attracted considerable attention as an
expression of "toxics populism" and as a model for innovative reform of
chemical regulation. Reflecting widespread public concern that "current
toxic laws aren't tough enough," 2 the initiative statute established a
new incentive structure for toxics regulation in an attempt to end the
regulatory paralysis affecting conventional approaches to hazard
3
identification, risk assessment and enforcement.
Proposition 65 shifts the burden of proof in the regulatory process
from government to industry. Use of chemicals known to cause cancer
or reproductive toxicity is no longer considered "innocent" until proven
"guilty" of harming public health by governmental agencies. Identified
hazards are placed on a list and automatically become subject to the
Act's warning requirements (12 months after listing) and discharge
* Dr. Pease received his Ph.D. in Environmental Health Sciences from the
University of California at Berkeley. He is an environmental planner with the San
Francisco Bay Regional Water Control Board, CaEPA.
1 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE (CH&SC) ch. 6.6, §§ 25249.5 et seq. (West
1986).
2 I REINER, BALLOT ARGUMENTiNFAVOROF PROPOSITION 65(1986).
3 Roe, Incentive-Conscious Approach to Toxic Chemical Control, 3 ECON.
DEvIL. Q. 179-187 (1989).
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prohibition (20 months after listing). Exemptions from these
requirements are allowed only if the business responsible for an
exposure or discharge can demonstrate that the amount of chemical in
question poses "no significant risk." Consequently, businesses have an
economic incentive to avoid using listed chemicals or to keep exposures
and discharges below levels that would pose any significant health risk.
Both businesses and government also have a legal incentive to reach
agreement quickly on the regulatory levels governing exemption from
the law.
This paper focuses on Proposition 65's approach to reforming the
hazard identification component of traditional toxic chemical regulation.
The environmental organizations promoting the initiative were
concerned that no federal regulatory agency had taken action on more
than one-third of the chemicals which had tested positive for
carcinogenicity in National Toxicology Program bioassays. 4 Even
less regulatory attention had been given to reproductive toxicants. 5 In
an effort to forestall prolonged procedural debates over whether specific
substances deserved regulation, Proposition 65 applies automatically to
all substances that have been identified as carcinogens or reproductive
toxicants by certain authoritative scientific or regulatory organizations.
By requiring regulation once scientists reach consensus that a substance
is a hazard, this approach immediately extends the scope of existing
controls and ensures that the regulatory process does not lag behind
scientific awareness of chemical hazards.
The "regulate upon identification" approach represents an effective
means for increasing and accelerating the regulatory coverage of known
hazards, but it also involves three major unforeseen consequences that
deserve analysis before similar reforms of other environmental statutes
are considered:
4 OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT (OTA), IDENTIFYING AND REGULATING
CARC OENS (1987).
5 GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE (GAO), REPRODUCTIVE AND DEVELOPMENTAL
TOXICANTS: REGULATORY ACrlONS PROVIDE UNCERTAIN PROTECTION (1991).
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First, the approach shifts the focus of political debate from
establishing standards to identifying substances for regulation. Because
only listed chemicals are affected by Proposition 65, hazard
identification has become a principal arena of controversy between
competing interest groups. Political concerns about regulatory impact
have shaped the listing process and been interjected into scientific
deliberations about a substance's toxicological characteristics,
demonstrating how policy can influence science at even the hazard
identification level of risk regulation.
Second, the approach requires that various regulatory and scientific
organizations share a consensus about what constitutes sufficient
evidence of hazard if a list that combines their identification efforts is to
be consistent. Criteria for identification, however, can vary substantially
across organizations. Substances will be evaluated differently depending
on whether an organization is more concerned about preventing potential
public health problems or minimizing the economic impact of false
positive identifications. If a combined list reflects inconsistent criteria,
regulatory resources may be misallocated as substances posing
substantially different degrees of hazard are treated identically.
Third, the approach encourages judging regulatory performance by
examining the extent of regulatory coverage rather than the effectiveness
of regulatory controls. Proposition 65 emphasizes expanding its list of
regulatory targets whenever there is scientific consensus that a substance
is a carcinogen or reproductive toxicant. However, scientific
considerations are not the only relevant criteria for selecting regulatory
targets. An effective program must also consider whether there is
significant human exposures to a substance and whether application of
regulatory requirements is likely to reduce health risks. Extending
regulatory coverage to more chemicals is attractive political symbolism,
but there are no public health benefits and potentially significant
administrative costs when targeted chemicals are neither in use nor
susceptible to regulatory control.
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This paper explores these issues by examining the origin, scientific
basis and regulatory scope of the Proposition 65 list. As of January 1,
1992, the list included 376 carcinogens and 127 reproductive
toxicants. 6 It represents the most extensive compilation of potential
human carcinogens available from any state, national or international
organization. Its list of reproductive toxicants is unique; no other
organization has undertaken a generic hazard identification process for
agents associated with male or female reproductive toxicity or
developmental toxicity. The Proposition 65 list is becoming an
authoritative source of hazard identification for a number of state and
7
federal regulatory programs.
Part II reviews the history of the list's expansion to reveal how the
political context of Proposition 65 has influenced the use of scientific
information in the regulatory process. Part III analyzes the selection
criteria and evidence underlying the listing of chemicals to illustrate what
tradeoffs are made between increasing the number of regulatory targets
and ensuring that regulation is based on consistent evaluations of
hazard. Part IV compares the uses of listed chemicals and their coverage
under existing federal environmental statutes to provide a quantitative
assessment of the regulatory scope of Proposition 65. The conclusion
assesses the costs and benefits of Proposition 65's approach to
reforming conventional hazard identification and identifies opportunities
for improving the process of selecting targets for regulation.

6
7

Cal. Code of Regulations (CCR) tit. 22, § 12000 (1992).
Pollution control laws which target chemicals identified as carcinogens or

reproductive toxicants under Proposition 65 have been introduced in a variety of
states. See e.g., H. 4618, Massachusetts Act to Provide Warnings of Significant
Health Risks from Toxic Chemicals (1990). Pending federal legislation to expand the
universe of chemicals covered by emissions reporting requirements also incorporate
the Proposition 65 list. See e.g., H.R. 2880, The Community Right-to-Know

More Act (1991).
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The Origin and Expansion of the Proposition 65 List
Confronted with the poor record of federal regulatory action on
potential human carcinogens and reproductive toxicants, the proponents
of Proposition 65 wanted to guarantee that scientifically identified
hazards were automatically regulated. The law would apply to a list of
agents "known to the State to cause cancer or reproductive toxicity"
established by California's Governor. 8 To redress the historical
delays between hazard identification and regulation, this list was to
include at a minimum substances already identified as carcinogens by
the National Toxicology Program (NTP) and the International Agency
for Research on Cancer (IARC) and as reproductive toxicants by the
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA).9
To provide a scientific basis for additional listing decisions,
California's Governor is authorized to consult with the "State's qualified
experts," who determine if "it has been clearly shown through
scientifically valid testing according to generally accepted principles"
that a chemical is a carcinogen or reproductive toxicant. To ensure that
hazard identifications conducted by other groups were incorporated into
the list, the State's experts are authorized to designate regulatory
agencies or scientific organizations they consider "authoritative" on
carcinogenesis or reproductive toxicity. Chemicals identified by these
bodies are automatically listed as known to the State to cause cancer or
reproductive toxicity. In addition, substances that are "formally
required... to be labeled or identified as causing cancer or reproductive
toxicity" by other state or federal agencies are also automatically added
to the Governor's Proposition 65 list.10
With these four methods of listing (the minimum list, nomination by
the State's experts, identification by an authoritative body or by
regulatory labeling requirements), proponents of Proposition 65
8 CH&SC § 25249.8.
9

CH&SC § 25249.8(a).

10 CH&SC § 25249.8(b).
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believed they had established an approach to hazard identification that
would quickly increase the universe of chemicals affected by regulation.
By emphasizing the role of scientific consensus in listing decisions
("authoritative" experts using "generally accepted principles"),
environmentalists also hoped to preclude political considerations from
this phase of the regulatory process. Listing decisions were exempted
from the procedural constraints (like notice and comment requirements)
typically applied to regulatory action. 11 Hazard identification was to
take place separately from working out the regulatory implications of
listing.
Since Proposition 65's requirements apply automatically if a
substance is listed, however, opponents of regulation are lead by the
law's structure to express their economic and political concerns during
the hazard identification phase. Specific industries and businesses have
attempted to prevent the listing of commercially important compounds
and the regulated community in general has sought to restrict the scope
of the law by slowing down the listing process. Delaying the initial date
of listing is attractive because it postpones potentially costly compliance
obligations.
During the first four years of Proposition 65 implementation, the
regulated community possessed a strong ally in California's Republican
Governor, George Deukmejian, who had vigorously opposed the
initiative statute. 12 Ignoring California voters' determination that
government agencies "have failed to provide them with adequate
protection" against toxic chemicals, 13 the Deukmejian Administration

I1 CH&SC § 25249.8(e).
12 The election of Republican Pete Wilson as Governor in 1990 may result in a
new approach to implementing Proposition 65. The law's incentive-based approach
is compatible with the Wilson Administration's interest in using market forces rather
than conventional command and control regulation to achieve environmental goals.
In addition, Proposition 65's focus on reducing unnecessary exposures to toxic
chemicals is consistent with the new Administration's emphasis on preventing
environmental and public health problems. P. WILSON, GOVERNOR'S
REORGANIZATION PiAN NUMBER ONE: CREATING THE CALIFORNIA ENVIRONMENTAL

PRoTECInoN AGENCY (1991).
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pursued an implementation strategy based on the premise that existing
environmental regulations are generally adequate. 14 Believing that
Proposition 65 "should not break new ground," 15 the Administration
sought to minimize the impact of the law in a variety of ways. In the
area of hazard identification, the Administration attempted to restrict the
number of chemicals affected by the law and to limit efforts to identify
new carcinogens or reproductive toxicants that were not covered by
existing regulations.
The creation of an administrative procedure for selecting, evaluating
and ultimately listing chemicals as carcinogens or reproductive toxicants
occurred within this political context. Proposition 65 includes several
methods for identifying chemical hazards, but it was left to the
Administration to define critical features of the listing process by
regulation. A Scientific Advisory Panel (SAP) of the "State's qualified
experts" was created to advise the Governor on listing decisions 16 and
13 CH&SC § 25249.5 (preamble).
14 See W. Pease, Environmental Pollution and Cancer in California: Evaluating
the Significance of Risks under Proposition 65 (1988) (Masters Thesis, Energy and

Resources Group, University of California at Berkeley), a detailed discussion of how
State regulations issued to implement Proposition 65 generally maintain compliance
with applicable federal laws (e.g., governing pesticide application, hazardous waste
disposal or occupational hazard communication) constitutes compliance with
Proposition 65.
15 Statement by Thomas Warriner, Deputy Secretary of the California Health and
Welfare Agency, reportedin The Sacremento Bee, Oct. 23, 1988. Warriner was the
Deukmejian Administration official responsible for implementing Proposition 65.
16 While Proposition 65 authorizes the Governor to consult with "qualified experts"
on listing decisions, CH&SC § 25249.8(d), it does not require formation of an
advisory panel. The SAP was created by regulations, CCR §§ 12302-12305, which
specified its composition and basic duties. The Governor retained complete control
over the appointment and removal of Panel members and asserted his "discretion to
accept or reject [Panel] advice in implementing the Act." CALIFORNIA HEALTH AND
WARE AGENCY

(CHWA), FINAL STATEMENT OF REASONS, 22 CODE OF

CALFORNIA REGULATIONS DIVIsION 2, SAFE DRINKING WATER

AND TOXIC

ENFORCEMENT ACTOF 1986 (1987).
The creation of scientific panels to advise regulatory agencies on controversial
issues is a common practice, although the independence, representativeness and
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to provide a forum for hazard identification debates. Announcing its
formation, Governor Deukmejian maintained that hazard identification
would not be politicized: "What we are doing is turning this decision
over to the scientists, to the experts.... It won't be politicians making
the decision. It won't be lobbyists for the business interest or lobbyists
17
for environmental interests."
The Deukmejian Administration, however, retained the ultimate
authority to make listing decisions. It controlled both the membership
and agenda of the SAP, 18 selecting which chemicals the Panel would
evaluate. Through regulations, it specified the conditions under which
hazard identifications made by authoritative bodies are automatically
added to the Proposition 65 list. 19 Regulations also define how
chemicals "formally required" to be labeled as carcinogens or
reproductive toxicants by other agencies are identified.2 0 The final say
on listing decisions was delegated to the California Health and Welfare
Agency (CHWA), the Governor's lead agency for implementing
Proposition 65.21 By shaping the listing process, the Administration
could influence both the number and type of chemicals affected by
Proposition 65's regulatory requirements.

authority of such panels vary widely. S. JASANOFF, THE FIFTH

BRANCH:

SCIENCE

ADVISERS AS POI CYMAKERS (1990). For one legal analyst's perspective on whether
"Governor Deukmejian... actually stacked the Panel to promote his own political
outlook," see Shaffer, Improving California's Safe Drinking Water and Toxic
Enforcement Act Scientific Advisory Panel Through Regulatory Reform, 77 CAL.
LAw REV. 1211-1258.
17 Los Angeles Times, Mar. 13, 1987, at 30.
18 K. Shaffer, supra note 16.
19 CCR § 12306.
20 CCR § 12902.
21 Cal. Exec. Order D-61-87 (1987) (Gov. George Deukmejian). As a result of an
administrative reorganization of environmental agencies in California, responsibility
for Proposition 65 was shifted from the CHWA to a newly formed California
Environmental Protection Agency in July 1991. Cal. Exec. Order W-15-91 (1991)
(Gov. Pete Wilson).
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Delaying the Inevitable:How Identified Carcinogens
Were notInitially Incorporatedinto the Proposition65 List
The first setback for environmentalist efforts to extend regulation to
unaddressed hazards occurred February 27, 1987, when Governor
Deukmejian announced that Proposition 65 applied to a short list of only
29 chemicals. This list included 26 substances with sufficient evidence
of carcinogenicity in humans according to IARC or NTP and 3
chemicals identified by OSHA as reproductive toxicants. Ignoring the
"minimum" list of more than 250 chemicals that was specifically
referenced in the statute, 22 the CHWA maintained that the State was
required to list only those chemicals known to cause cancer in humans,
and not all chemicals known to cause cancer in experimental animals and
hence suspected of being human carcinogens.
The Administration attempted to provide a scientific justification for
its political decision to restrict the list, but it quickly became known that
the CHWA had ignored the advice of its public health experts in the
California Department of Health Services 23 (CDHS). Those experts
argued unsuccessfully that the Governor was "scientifically and
ethically" required to apply Proposition 65 to the larger list of animal
carcinogens and emphasized that "from its perspective, the Department
of Health Services does not believe human exposures to known animal
carcinogens to be in the best interest of public health."24
Environmentalists maintained that the Deukmejian Administration
was placing special interests above human health. Al Meyerhoff, an
attorney for the Natural Resources Defense Council, charged that
chemical companies had influenced the Governor to shorten the list and
accomplished "through the back door what they couldn't do at the
polls."'2 5 Joining with labor unions, proponents of Proposition 65
22 CH&SC § 25249.8(a).

23 Los Angeles Times, Mar. 17, 1987, at 3.
24 Memo from S. Book to Alex Kelter, Cal. Dept. of Health Services (Jan. 22,
1987) (discussing the use of animal carcinogens for the Proposition 65 list of cancer

causing chemicals).
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promptly filed suit to expand the list and won the first round in court. In
April 1987, the Sacramento County Superior Court ordered the
Governor to add more than 200 chemicals to his initial list. 26
The Deukmejian Administration continued to resist the automatic
extension of Proposition 65's requirements to all the substances
identified as potential human carcinogens by IARC and NTP. Pursuing
a very effective strategy of delay, the CHWA appealed the Court's
decision and directed the Governor's SAP to evaluate all the disputed
compounds from the "minimum" list substance-by-substance. The SAP
obliged, reviewing the CHWA's "candidate" list of carcinogens
alphabetically and slowly recommending that they be added to the
Proposition 65 list. 27 Through its control over the SAP's agenda, the
Administration ensured that the Panel spent its initial two years
reviewing data on chemicals that were already legally covered by
Proposition 65 rather than conducting de novo hazard identifications.
Throughout the political struggle over the size of the Proposition 65
list, the Governor's expert advisors on the SAP approached their tasks
from a predominantly scientific perspective, questioning neither the
Administration's control of their agenda nor the legal ramifications of
their review of the "minimum" list. As scientists representing the
different disciplines involved in cancer and reproductive risk
assessment, SAP members clearly preferred conducting their own
evaluations of toxicological data to simply accepting hazard
25 Los Angeles Times, Feb. 28, 1987, at 1.
26 AFL-CIO v. Deukmejian, No. 348195 (Sacramento County Superior Court

April 24, 1987).

27 Safe Drinking Water and Toxic Enforcement Act Scientific Advisory Panel
(SAP) members invited efforts to prioritize their evaluations on the basis of a
chemical's "inherently controversial nature, high public visibility.... [or potential
for] widespread human exposure in California." SAP, TRANSCRIPT OF PUBLIC
METING ON OCT. 30, 1987, at 11, 156 (Capitol Reporters 1987) (subsequent

references to SAP transcripts are cited only as SAP - with date and page number).
When no schemes to rank chemicals by opportunity for exposure or regulatory
control were subsequently proposed, the SAP proceeded alphabetically except for its
consideration of alcohol and tobacco.
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identifications by other organizations. The SAP's predisposition to
independent review facilitated the Administration's efforts to minimize
the impact of Proposition 65 listing methods that had been designed to
accelerate hazard identification.
By the time the Deukmejian Administration's position on the "short"
list was finally repudiated by the courts, the environmentalist's legal
victory actually had only a limited impact on the size of the Proposition
65 list. California's Court of Appeal upheld the lower court's order to
expand the Proposition 65 list in July 1989, but by then about 90% of
the chemicals at issue had already been nominated by the SAP and
placed on the list. The Administration's strategy of delay had granted
temporary regulatory reprieves of from 1 to 30 months for many
chemicals, as well as monopolized the agenda of the SAP. While the
Court emphasized that Proposition 65 directs the State and the SAP "to
engage in a diligent, thorough, and continuing search for additional
chemicals which evolving scientific knowledge demonstrates are subject
to the Act," 28 the Deukmejian Administration successfully frustrated
new hazard identification efforts through its control over the listing
process.
Environmentalists believed chemical-by-chemical reviews were
unnecessary if substances had already been identified as carcinogens.
One goal of Proposition 65 was to establish a listing process that
automatically incorporated hazard identifications by other scientific and
regulatory organizations. To initiate this process, the proponents of
Proposition 65 petitioned the SAP to designate EPA and other agencies
as "authoritative" bodies; chemicals identified by these agencies could
then be added to the Governor's list without further review. Concerned
about losing their prerogative to make listing decisions, the SAP decided
not to recognize any authoritative bodies. 29
To environmentalists, the SAP's refusal to designate authoritative
28 AFL-CIO v. Deukmejian, 212 Cal. App. 3d 425,440 (1989).
29 SAP, Oct. 30, 1987, at 158.
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bodies was just another manifestation of the Administration's strategy of
delaying full implementation of Proposition 65. 30 They challenged the
policy in court, charging the SAP with "arbitrarily failing to act" and
"abuse of discretion," and won a summary judgment in April 1989.31
Confronted with the Court's order to evaluate various organizations for
designation as authoritative bodies, the SAP subsequently agreed to
accept hazard identification decisions made by EPA, 3 2 IARC and
NTP 33 and the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and the National
Institute of Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH). 34
Policy concerns about the potential regulatory impact of Proposition
65 have clearly shaped the role of independent scientific review in the
listing process. In order to prevent Proposition 65 from applying
immediately to hundreds of chemicals that had been identified as
carcinogens by 1987, the Deukmejian Administration initially insisted
that the SAP reevaluate each chemical individually. After the adverse
court decisions of 1989, this policy shifted as the Administration sought
to ensure its control over the listing process. Once it became inevitable
that the Proposition 65 list would include virtually all the chemicals that
have been identified as carcinogens by other authoritative agencies,
further Administration efforts to restrain growth of the list focused on
discouraging de novo hazard identification by the Panel.
CHWA informed the SAP in late 1989 that evaluating data on
chemicals that were identified as carcinogens by other authoritative
bodies was unnecessary. 35 Using its control over the SAP agenda, the
30 San Francisco Chronicle, April 4, 1989, at 1.
31 AFL-CIO v. Deukmejian, No. 359223 (Sacramento County Superior Court June
22, 1988).
32 SAP, April 14, 1989.
33 SAP, Oct. 20, 1989.
34 SAP, April 6, 1990. The SAP declined to designate the American Council of
Governmental and Industrial Hygienists as authoritative because the Panel was
unfamiliar with the ACGIH identification process. California regulatory agencies
were not designated as authoritative to avoid the appearance of conflict of interest;
both CDHS and the California Department of Food and Agriculture (CDFA) are
active in the regulatory implementation of Proposition 65.

Pease: Identifying Chemical Hazards for Regulation 139

Administration effectively eliminated further carcinogen identification
efforts by the, Panel. No resources were allocated to identifying
chemicals that had bioassay data but remained unevaluated by other
groups; panel discussions were redirected to risk assessment issues.
While the Proposition 65 list has slowly grown to include the results of
most existing carcinogen identification efforts, the listing method that
environmentalists expected to make new contributions to hazard
identification has proven to be a disappointment: The SAP has been
responsible for identifying only one of 117 carcinogens listed between
October 1989 and January 1992.36
Searchingfor Authority:
Basesfor Identifying Reproductive Toxicants
Proposition 65's mandate to regulate reprodictive toxicants presents
a significant challenge to conventional approaches to hazard
identification. Reproductive endpoints like developmental toxicity and
male or female reproductive toxicity have not been the focus of chemical
testing programs and have rarely served as the basis for regulation. 37
In contrast to the situation with carcinogens, no scientific or regulatory
agencies have compiled lists of known reproductive toxicants. With
reproductive toxicants, the reform sought by the proponents of
35 The CHWA informed SAP members that "if the Panel identifies EPA, IARC,
and NTP as authoritative bodies for purposes of Proposition 65, there will be no need
to discuss the chemicals" identified by these organizations as carcinogens. Letter from
S. Book, CHWA, to SAP Members on Aug. 9, 1989.
36 The SAP has reviewed data on only two potential carcinogens since mid-1989. It
evaluated two pesticides at its April 1991 meeting, listing oxadiazon and refusing to
list tetrachlorvinphos. Neither substance was considered as a result of de novo hazard
identification efforts by the Panel. Oxadiazon had been deferred from an earlier
meeting, where it was brought to the Panel's attention because it was on an EPA list
of potential carcinogens. Tetrachlorvinphos had also been deferred from an earlier
meeting, where it was brought to the Panel's attention because of National Cancer
Institute test results.
37 GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE (GAO), REPRODUCTIVE AND DEVELOPMENTAL
TOXICANTS: REGULATORY ACTIONs PROVIDE UNCERTAIN PROTECiION (1991).
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Proposition 65 transcended establishing legal mechanisms for extending
regulatory coverage automatically to hazards identified by other
authorities. Success would require the creation of both a scientific
consensus on how to define reproductive hazards and a review process
that could systematically evaluate data and identify substances for
listing.
Listing reproductive toxicants was initially a major focus of the
SAP. With CDHS staff support, the SAP added ten chemicals to the
Governor's initial list of three reproductive toxicants by July 1987,
formed a Subpanel on Reproductive Toxicity and developed a priority
list for future nominations. 38 The first compounds to be identified were
either drugs (like diethylstilbestrol and thalidomide) or environmental
contaminants (like methyl mercury) with extensive human evidence of
reproductive harm.
The SAP's ability to reach agreement quickly on hazard
identification decisions eroded once it finished reviewing data on
textbook reproductive toxicants. To guide their assessment of
substances with limited human evidence or just animal evidence, Panel
members decided to "develop guidelines criteria used for identifying
teratogens or reproductive toxicants. ' 39 The SAP had confronted a
similar need for carcinogen identification guidelines, but it had decided
to "recognize the work that's already been done in the field without
reinventing it ' 40 and use existing EPA guidelines. Apparently unaware
that there were comparable EPA guidelines for reproductive hazard
identification, 4 1 the SAP suspended listing activities and began
38 SAP, April 14, 1988.
39 SAP, Mar. 31, 1987, at 30.

40 Id., at 110.

41 At the first SAP meeting, Chairman Kilgore reported that he was advised by the

reproductive scientists on the Panel that "we do not have the guidelines that we have
available for carcinogens." The full Panel's subsequent discussion makes no mention
of the existence of EPA criteria for identifying developmental toxicants (published in
1986) or draft EPA criteria for identifying male and female reproductive toxicants.
SAP, Mar. 31, 1987, at 118 et seq. EPA developmental criteria were briefly cited at
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developing its own guidelines.
Shaping the criteria for listing became a major focus of all parties
interested in the regulatory impact of Proposition 65.42 The effort to
initiate a generic process for identifying reproductive toxicants occurred
in an even more politically charged context than carcinogen
identification. While many listed carcinogens are already regulated under
other environmental laws, identifying reproductive toxicants under
Proposition 65 promised to subject a previously unaddressed class of
toxic compounds to stringent new requirements. The law's proponents
encouraged the SAP to adopt guidelines that were consistent with EPA's
approach and quickly return to evaluating chemicals for listing.
Concerned that thousands of chemicals have at least some evidence
of reproductive toxicity, opponents of Proposition 65 sought to delay
reproductive hazard identification. They argued that the consequences of
listing a substance under Proposition 65 would be so severe (e.g.,
costly restrictions on chemical use, inappropriate public response to
warnings) that novel constraints needed to be placed on established
approaches to hazard identification. Represented by the International
Life Sciences Institute-Nutrition Foundation (ILSI), a group which
receives its support from food industry corporations, opponents
maintained that current federal guidelines on reproductive toxicity
needed to be significantly modified. ILSI's own "expert committees"
proposed hazard identification criteria4 3 which narrowly defined
reproductive toxicity, restricted the types of evidence considered
sufficient for listing and generally limited the number of chemicals likely
to be affected by Proposition 65. 44
the first Subpanel meeting devoted to guidelines development, SAP Subpanel, April

14, 1988, at 62, but there appears to have been no discussion of simply adopting
these criteria.

42 Pease, When Scientists Become Policy Makers: Shaping Hazard Identification
underProposition65., 5 REPRoD. TOXICOL. 169-173 (1991).
43 Mattison et al., Criteriafor Identifying and Listing Substances Known to Cause
Developmental Toxicity under California'sProposition 65, 4 REPROD. TOXICOL.
163-175 (1990).
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In such a contested debate, the Reproductive Subpanel's effort to
develop its own approach to reproductive hazard identification collapsed
as it sought to base its policy decisions on existing scientific consensus.
It ultimately proposed criteria for identifying developmental toxicants 45
that were substantially equivalent to existing EPA guidelines. 46 Plans
to develop independent criteria for identifying male and female
reproductive toxicants never materialized; the SAP criteria incorporate
EPA female and male reproductive toxicity guidelines by reference. 47
Completion of the developmental toxicity guidelines in late 1988
appeared to provide the SAP with the evaluation criteria it needed to
address more difficult listing decisions. Only two substances had been
listed during the period of guidelines development; both had substantial
human evidence of reproductive toxicity (ethyl alcohol in alcoholic
beverages and tobacco smoke). During 1989, the SAP identified 16
reproductive toxicants, including several industrial chemicals with
strong animal evidence but only limited human data (e.g., glycol
ethers).
This renewed listing activity was short-lived, however. As with
carcinogens, the Deukmejian Administration used its administrative
control over the listing process to discourage de novo hazard
identification by the SAP and ensure that new listings did not extend
regulatory controls to unaddressed chemicals. The Reproductive
Subpanel that had been screening reproductive toxicants for the full SAP
was allowed to disintegrate by the CHWA.4 8 With no members who
44 Pease, supranote 42.
45 SAP, CRITERIA FOR RECOMMENDING CHEMICALS FOR LISTING AS "KNOWN TO

TE STATE TO CAUSE REPRODUCrVE Toxicnr" (1988).
46 Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), Proposed Amendments to the
Guidelines for the Health Assessment of Suspect Developmental Toxicants, 53 Fed.

Reg. 9386-9403 (1989).
47 EPA, Proposed Guidelines for Assessing Female Reproductive Risk, 53 Fed.
Reg. 24834-24847 (1988); EPA, Proposed Guidelines for Assessing Male
Reproductive Risk, 53 Fed. Reg. 24850-24868 (1988).
48 After the Subpanel's February 1989 meeting, its initial four members resigned
because of other professional commitments or frustration with the Proposition 65
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participated in creating the consensus on hazard identification guidelines
and only one expert in reproductive toxicity, the full SAP now has only
a limited institutional capacity to identify reproductive hazards. The SAP
has been responsible for identifying only four of the 99 reproductive
toxicants listed between October 1989 and January 1992. 49
The CHWA has largely taken over the listing process, acting to
restrict listing to those substances already regulated by other federal
regulatory agencies as reproductive toxicants. Unwilling to allow the
SAP to make major new contributions to reproductive hazard
identification, the Administration has sought out other "authoritative"
sources for listing. It has relied most heavily on labeling requirements
established by FDA for prescription drugs, almost doubling the
Proposition 65 list of reproductive toxicants during 1990.50 As with
recently identified carcinogens, these listings have occurred
automatically, without any review by the SAP or reference to the SAP
guidelines. Because federal drug regulation is generally more stringent
than Proposition 65 (and preempts state regulation as well), listed
prescription drugs are generally unaffected by Proposition 65's
regulatory requirements. By focusing on listing drugs, the Deukmejian
Administration was able to appear as if it was extending Proposition
65's coverage of reproductive toxicants without actually imposing any
new regulatory burdens on commercial interests.
process and were never replaced by the CHWA.
49 The SAP has reviewed data on five reproductive toxicants since mid-1989 and
decided to list aspirin, PCBs, toluene and benomyl.
50 After the CHWA began placing therapeutic drugs on the SAP agenda in 1989,
Panel member Diana Petitti recommended designating FDA as an authoritative body
in order to preclude time-consuming, case-by-case reviews and to devote resources to
evaluating chemicals other than drugs. Letter to S. Book, CHWA (Nov. 30, 1989).
While the SAP subsequently designated FDA as authoritative in April 1990, CHWA
chose not to list FDA-rated drugs as reproductive toxicants under the authoritative
bodies rule, relying instead on the regulatory labeling rule that did not require any
sufficiency of evidence test. See note 94 infra for a complete discussion of the
CHWA focus on listing drugs.
3 RISK -Issues in Health &Safety 127 [Spring 19921

ControllingHazardIdentification:
The AdninistrativeImplementation of EnvironmentalReform
Proposition 65's "regulate upon identification" approach has not
eliminated the concerns about economic and political impact that have
traditionally paralyzed toxic chemical regulation. The State's approach to
listing substances under Proposition 65 has been primarily determined
by concerns about regulatory impact rather than by commitment to
improving the hazard identification process. During the Deukmejian
Administration's implementation of the law, one principal Proposition
65 reform (automatic extension of regulatory coverage to known
toxicants) was successfully delayed and another (establishment of an
independent chemical review process) was completely frustrated. The
law's explicit mandate to list carcinogens already identified by
authoritative organizations was ignored by the Deukmejian
Administration. Over two years were required to extend Proposition
65's regulatory requirements to the chemicals on its initial "minimum"
list.
While political opposition to accelerating regulatory coverage of
known hazards was eventually overcome, it has proven more difficult to
create an institutionalized source of de novo hazard identification. No
independent process for reviewing toxicological data and identifying
new hazards has been established. Using its control of the SAP's
agenda and resources, the Deukmejian Administration virtually
eliminated the Panel's role in the Proposition 65 listing process. 5 1 The
SAP has considered listing only two carcinogens and five reproductive
toxicants since October 1989. Figure 1 shows the number of chemicals
evaluated for carcinogenicity and reproductive toxicity at each SAP
meeting since June 1987, revealing the dramatic decline over time of the
51 In 1989, the CHWA reduced the SAP schedule to two meetings per year instead
of four and directed the SAP to review quantitative risk assessments of listed
Proposition 65 chemicals. As a result of political changes at the gubernatorial level
in California, the SAP has not met for any purpose since April 1991.
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Panel's hazard identification efforts.
The State's administrative control over the Proposition 65 listing
process has had a much more substantial impact on the law's effort to
extend regulatory controls to reproductive toxicants than carcinogens.
While the listing of many carcinogens may have been delayed, it could
not be completely prevented. For reproductive toxicants, the absence of
other authoritative hazard identification programs allowed the State
considerably more opportunity to limit Proposition 65's impact. By
preventing the creation of an independent chemical review process, the
State ensured that the law's goal of instituting the first generic regulatory
program focused on reproductive toxicants would remain unfulfilled.
Figure 1
Number of Chemicals Evaluated at SAP Meetings
60

* Carcinogens
* Reproductive Toxicants

30

-,------

Z
0
0

6/87

8/87 10/87 12/87

1/88

4/88

9/88 12/88

4/89 10/89

4/90 10/90

4/91

SAP Meeting Date

3 RISK -Issues in Health &Safety 127 [Spring 1992]

Scientific Consistency of the Proposition 65 List
The listing methods established by Proposition 65 intentionally
combine hazard identification efforts by various regulatory and scientific
organizations, but the law establishes no mechanism for ensuring that
listing decisions are supported by consistent evidence. Proposition 65
requires that SAP nominated chemicals be "clearly shown through
scientifically valid testing according to generally accepted principles to
cause cancer or reproductive toxicity, ' '52 but provides no additional
guidance on how strong evidence needs to be for listing. The statute
establishes no explicit requirements for chemicals listed as a result of
identification by authoritative bodies or regulatory labeling. 53 Aiming
to compile a list of regulatory targets quickly, proponents of the law
avoided attempting to define the amount of scientific evidence required
to justify preventive regulation.
The absence of guidance about what constitutes sufficient evidence
for listing has two potentially adverse consequences for the Proposition
65 hazard identification process. First, to the extent that the combined
list reflects inconsistent criteria, regulatory resources may be
misallocated as substances posing substantially different degrees of
hazard are treated identically. Second, opportunities to introduce a
double standard into listing decisions have increased. The evidentiary
threshold for listing commercially significant substances can be higher
than for unimportant substances. This section assesses the consistency
of evidence used to suppor listing by examining how substances were
identified as hazards. Methods of listing and sources for
identification 54 of carcinogens and reproductive toxicants are reviewed.
52 CH&SC § 25249.8(b).
53 Interpreting the ambiguous language of Proposition 65, CHWA regulations have
further confused this issue by imposing a sufficiency of evidence test on
identifications by authoritative bodies, CCR § 12306, but not on identifications by
regulatory labeling requirements. In the case of listing as a result of labeling,
substances are known to cause cancer or reproductive toxicity if a formally required
message is "intended to communicate a risk" of cancer or reproductive toxicity, no

matter what strength of evidence supports the warning. CCR § 12902.
54 CHWA, CHEMICALS KNOWNTO THE STATE To CAUSE CANCER OR REPRODUCTIVE
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Carcinogens
Table 1 classifies listed Proposition 65 carcinogens by their method
of listing and by the agency responsible for their identification as
carcinogens. As a result of independent efforts, the SAP has identified
54 chemicals as carcinogens. 55 If one accepts the legal decision that a
"minimum" list of 235 carcinogens was established by Proposition 65,
it is clear that the vast majority (85%) of carcinogens have been listed on
the basis of hazard identifications made by two authoritative scientific
organizations, NTP and IARC. Several regulatory agencies have also
made contributions as authoritative bodies: EPA, for example, is
responsible for identifying most pesticides listed as carcinogens. Very
few chemicals have been listed as carcinogens on the basis of regulatory
labeling requirements. 56

Toxicry: BASIS FOR I.SNG (1991).

55 Crediting the SAP for their review of agents on the "minimum" list increases
their hazard identification contribution from 15% to almost 60% of the list.
Assuming that 43 of the 54 agents listed as a result of SAP de novo review would
have eventually been listed automatically because they had been classified by an
authoritative body reduces the SAP's contribution to less than 5% of the list.
56 Warning requirements for occupational carcinogens have been used inconsistently
as a source of listing by the CHWA. Five chemicals labeled "cancer hazard" or
"regulated carcinogen" by California OSHA were automatically listed in July 1987,
SAP, June 18, 1987, at 6 et seq. & 162 et seq., while eight chemicals labeled "cancer
suspect agent" (a term applied by OSHA to several known human carcinogens) and
one labeled "potential cancer hazard" were not listed on the basis of warning
requirements. CCR tit. 8, §§ 5209-5220.
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Table 1
Method of Hazard Identification: Carcinogens
Method of Listing

Total5 7

Agents on Minimum List
Governor's initial list
SAP review
Labeling requirement
Duke I lawsuit 58

235
27
176
5
28

205

162

Agents not on Min.List
141
Authoritative body
86
Labeling requirement
1
SAP de novo reviews
54
- Agents not classified
as carcinogens by
IARC, EPA or NTP
11
* Agents classified 6° as
carcinogens by IARC,
EPA or NTP
43

62
43

25
12

55
29

19

13

26

Total

376

Source of HazardIdentification
IARC NTP EPA FDA NIOSH OSHA

267 187

8

55

5
4

5
5

0
NA59

5

5

8

57 In all tables, the sums exceed subtotals because of overlaps in subcategories.
Here, for example, several organizations have identified the same listed agent as a
carcinogen.
58 The case in which environmentalists challenged the State's initial short list of
Proposition 65 compounds is known as "Duke I." After the California Court of
Appeals ruled against the State, 28 substances on the minimum list that had not yet
been reviewed by the SAP were automatically listed.
59 OSHA is not an "authoritative body."
60 The SAP evaluated a number of agents that were classified as carcinogens by
various agencies before it designated those agencies as authoritative bodies. Agents
classified by an authoritative body (e.g., EPA B2 carcinogens) and possessing
sufficient evidence of carcinogenicity (according to CCR § 1306) would have
eventually been listed automatically.
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Concerns about creating a list of carcinogens without consistent
hazard identification criteria were taken into account early in the listing
process. The SAP decided to rely on existing EPA carcinogen
identification guidelines in its evaluations. 6 1 To address SAP concerns
about the adequacy of chemical evaluations conducted by authoritative
bodies like NTP and IARC, the CHWA issued regulations requiring that
their hazard identifications meet defined criteria for "sufficient evidence"
in order for a chemical to be automatically listed. 62 While there are
differences between NTP's approach, IARC's strength of evidence
approach and EPA's weight of evidence approach, 6 3 these authoritative
bodies share common definitions of what constitutes sufficient evidence
64
for identifying a chemical as a potential human carcinogen.
Application of uniform identification criteria has created a list of
chemicals supported by relatively consistent evidence of carcinogenicity.
Chemicals identified by authoritative bodies using substantially different
criteria than EPA have been subjected to more intensive review by the
CHWA before automatic listing. FDA, for example, relies on expert
committees working without uniform guidelines to identify carcinogens.
It has accepted single positive bioassays as evidence of carcinogenicity
and rarely publishes its identification decisions. After CHWA review,
only a portion of chemicals considered carcinogens by FDA have been
61 SAP, Mar. 31, 1987, at 109; SAP, June 18, 1987, at 64.
62 CCR § 12306.
63 Ashby et al., A Scheme for Classifying Carcinogens,12 REGUL. TOXICOL.
PHARMAcOL. 270-295 (1990).
64 Matula & Somers, The Classification of Chemical Carcinogens, 10 REGUL.
TOXIOL. PHARMACOL. 174-182 (1989). The few disagreements over hazard
identification between the SAP, EPA, NTP and IARC have been limited to
chemicals with marginal carcinogen rankings. While the SAP generally considers
EPA Category C or IARC Group 3 compounds to have insufficient evidence of

carcinogenicity, its independent review of the data has led to the listing of several
such chemicals. Two chemicals that elicited extensive discussions before listing were
para-dichlorobenzene, SAP, Dec. 16, 1988, at 100 et seq., and oxadiazon, SAP, April
26, 1991, at 5 et seq.
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listed. 6 5 Similarly, a number of commercially important agents
considered potential occupational carcinogens by NIOSH (e.g., asphalt
fumes) have not been listed automatically because of problems with
formal documentation or evidence. 66
The State's effort to ensure that listed carcinogens meet its criteria
for sufficient scientific evidence has involved a significant tradeoff
between scientific consistency and extent of regulatory coverage.
Because Proposition 65 establishes no evidentiary test for substances
identified as a result of labeling requirements, a large number of
chemicals regulated in the workplace have potential for listing. OSHA's
Hazard Communication Standard requires that industry provide workers
with warnings on material safety data sheets about all substances which
have exhibited carcinogenic potential in one valid, positive animal
bioassay. 6 7 Although these substances satisfy Proposition 65's
procedural criteria for automatic listing, many do not meet the State's
sufficiency of evidence test. Consistent with its policy of restricting the
extent of Proposition 65's coverage, CHWA has used its administrative
discretion to avoid listing so many potential occupational carcinogens.

65 In 1990, CDHS identified a set of 38 chemicals considered carcinogens by FDA,
but the lack of public documentation and/or the failure to meet criteria for sufficiency
of evidence, CCR § 12306, resulted in only 7 compounds being listed
authoritatively.
66 In 1990, CDHS identified a set of 28 agents considered potential occupational
carcinogens by NIOSH, but the lack of public documentation and/or the failure to
meet criteria for sufficiency of evidence, CCR § 12306, resulted in only 5
compounds being listed authoritatively. NIOSH also identifies several classes of
compounds (monohalomethanes and vinyl halides) as potential occupational
carcinogens, National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH),
NIOSH Recommendationsfor OccupationalSafety and Health Standards,37(S-7)
MMWR SUPPLM4ENT 1-29 (1988), but CHWA has not listed specific chemicals like
methyl bromide, methyl chloride or vinyl fluoride because they do not individually
meet sufficiency of evidence criteria.
67 29 C.F.R. §§ 1910 & 1200 (1990).
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Reproductive Toxicants6 8
Table 2 classifies listed Proposition 65 reproductive toxicants by
their method of listing and by the agency responsible for their
identification as hazards. Independent review by the SAP has identified
27% of listed reproductive toxicants, double the Panel's de novo
contribution to carcinogen identification. The Panel has played a more
important role because no scientific or regulatory agencies have
organized programs to identify reproductive toxicants. Just two
reproductive toxicants have been listed as a result of identification by
authoritative bodies: TCDD (by EPA) and nitrofurantoin (by NTP).
In contrast with carcinogens, most reproductive toxicants (72%)
have been listed automatically on the basis of regulatory labeling
requirements. FDA prescription drug labels account for 65% of the list;
EPA and CDFA pesticide labels account for 7% of the list.6 9 Among
68 The CHWA officially lists reproductive toxicants as male, female or
developmental toxicants, although this classification is not based on
recommendations made by the SAP or any complete review of available toxicological
data. The SAP Reproductive Subpanel regularly recommended listing chemicals as
"reproductive toxicants," without specifying the type of toxicity. The basis for the
State's classification of reproductive endpoints was questioned publicly during an
SAP Subpanel meeting (using the example of ethylene oxide), but CHWA never
provided an adequate explanation of its approach. SAP Subpanel, Oct. 31, 1988, at
79 et seq.
Classification generally indicates which reproductive endpoint possessed the
strongest evidence of toxicity, but it cannot be reliably used to distinguish which
populations are susceptible to listed compounds. Ethylene oxide, for example, was
listed as a female reproductive toxicant on the basis of OSHA regulation. There is,
however, both suggestive evidence in human males and clear evidence in rats and
monkeys that the chemical is a male reproductive toxicant as well. AGENCY FOR
ToxIc SUBSTANCES AND DISEASE REGISTRY (ATSDR), TOXICOLOGICAL PROFILE FOR
EmYIENE OXIDE (1990). There are several examples where SAP members stated

compounds were "reviewed only for developmental toxicity" and agreed that they also
possessed evidence of male reproductive toxicity, but CHWA only listed them as
developmental toxicants (e.g., chlorambucil, SAP Subpanel, Oct. 31, 1988, at 123).
Similar inconsistencies are apparent in the classification of listed therapeutic drugs:
label warnings for procarbazine hydrochloride, for example, note case reports of
developmental toxicity and clinical studies indicating azoospermia and antifertility
effects, PHYSICIN's DESK REFERENCE (PDR) (1991), but the drug is only listed as a
developmental toxicant.
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scientific and regulatory agencies, FDA has played the predominant role
in reproductive hazard identification because it has the statutory
authority to require that pharmaceutical manufacturers report adverse
effects from use of their products. The strongest evidence of
reproductive toxicity generally involves epidemiological studies of
human high dose exposures, but such exposures are regularly
monitored only in therapeutic settings. Since there is no mandatory
surveillance of high dose exposures occurring in the workplace, there is
usually less human evidence of reproductive toxicity for commercial
chemicals.
Table 2
Method of Hazard Identification: Reproductive Toxicants
Method of Listing

Governor's Initial List
Labeling requirement
Authoritative Body
SAP de novo review
* Agents not
classified by FDA
* Agents
classified by FDA
Total

Total

3
91
2
31

Source ofHazardIdentification
FDA NTP EPA CDFA Calif. OSHA
3
82

3

1

1

6
1

1

7

3

1

22
9
127

82

3

69 As with carcinogens (see supra note 56), occupational warning requirements
have been used inconsistently by the CHWA to identify reproductive toxicants. The
California OSHA label for ethylene dibromide (EDB), for example, uses the same
words ("may cause sterility") as the label for the listed male reproductive toxicant
dibromochloropropane, CCR tit. 8, §§ 5212 & 5219, but EDB has never even been
considered for listing as a reproductive toxicant.
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Listing decisions made by the SAP or on the basis of EPA labeling
have generally been supported by consistent evidence because of the
similarity between SAP and EPA guidelines for evaluating
developmental, male and female reproductive toxicants. 7 0 Listing
decisions based on FDA labeling, however, are frequently not
supported by similar types of evidence. 7 1 Compared with the SAP or
EPA, FDA conducts hazard identification using a lower evidentiary
threshold and a different process. No uniform criteria guide FDA efforts
to identify reproductive toxicants (Frankos, 1985).72 Suggestive case
reports or chemical similarity may be sufficient to justify providing
patients and physicians with a warning about potential adverse
reproductive effects. The agency also considers tradeoffs which are
unique to therapeutic agents, placing drugs in pregnancy categories
based on the degree of risk to the fetus balanced against the drug's
potential benefits to a patient.73
70 The pesticide cyanazine may be an exception to this generalization. While listed
as a result of EPA labeling requirements, its supporting evidence may not satisfy
SAP criteria for identifying developmental toxicants. The birth defects associated
with cyanazine are present "at doses which cause serious maternal illness in
laboratory animals;" SAP criteria require special evaluations of this type of adverse
effect.
71 There is a wide range in the strength of evidence supporting FDA rating and
labeling requirements. PDR (1991). This evidence includes well-conducted
epidemiological studies (e.g., androgens and estrogens), case reports alone (e.g.,
procarbazine hydrochloride), reports of experience with a class of drugs (e.g., anticonvulsants and benzodiazepines), or very limited animal studies (e.g., mitomycin
and clomiphene citrate). Some labeled drugs do not even have individual evidence of
developmental toxicity. For example, there are no positive clinical reports or animal
evidence to support identifying most aminoglycosides as developmental toxicants.
FDA Category D ratings for these drugs are based only on their chemical similarity
to streptomycin, which is associated with fetal deafness if used during pregnancy.
72 Frankos, FDA Perspectives on the Use of Teratology Data for Human Risk
Assessment, 5 FUND. APPL. TOXICOL. 615-625 (1985). FDA attempts to develop
criteria to support consistent interpretation and use of reproductive data, Interagency
Regulatory Liaison Group (IRLG), Interagency Regulatory Liaison Group
Workshop on Reproductive Toxicity Risk Assessment, 66 ENVIRON. HEALTH
PERSPECr. 193-221. (1986), were never completed.
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By emphasizing hazard identification based on FDA drug
labeling, 74 the Deukmejian Administration introduced a clear double
standard into the Proposition 65 list of reproductive toxicants.
Therapeutic drugs (which are unlikely to be affected by the law's
regulatory requirements) have been listed on the basis of limited animal
studies or even membership in a chemical class. Commercially
significant substances, however, have only been listed if SAP or EPA
sufficiency of evidence criteria are met. Ironically, the lower threshold

of evidence for drugs originates in the FDA's health-conservative
approach to identifying potential reproductive toxicants. If the State
were to consistently apply such a preventive bias to the implementation
of Proposition 65, a significant number of industrial substances would
be suitable for listing. Many commercially significant substances that
have been reviewed possess evidence of reproductive toxicity that is
comparable to that supporting the listing of many therapeutic drugs.75
Regulatory Scope of the Proposition 65 List
Proposition 65's proponents accepted that the law could "not cover
all potentially harmful chemicals. It concentrates only on the known
worst offenders."' 7 6 The law's principal criterion for selecting
73 21 C.F.R. § 201.57 (1990). Current pregnancy category labeling for therapeutic
drugs can be found in the PDR (1991).
To obtain complete control over the listing of labeled reproductive toxicants,
CHWA eliminated any review of its decisions by the SAP or even CDHS
professional staff. Consequently, apparent agency errors in the use of FDA pregnancy
categories, PDR (1991), were not corrected. CHWA failed to consistently list all
drugs rated Category D ("positive evidence of human fetal risk or... known
teratogenic effect in some animal species") or Category X ("studies in animals or
human beings have demonstrated fetal abnormalities .... contraindicated in women who
are or may become pregnant"). For example, quinine is rated Category X with reports
of congenital malformations in humans and strong evidence of teratogenicity in
animals, but has not been listed. Five aminoglycosides are rated Category D and have
identical supporting evidence, but only three have been identified as reproductive
toxicants under Proposition 65. (Amikacin sulfate, netilmycin sulfate and tobramycin
sulfate have been listed; kanomycin sulfate and neomycin sulfate have not.)
75 J. SCHARDEIN, CHEMICALLY INDUCED BIRTH DEFEcrs (1985).
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regulatory targets is whether there is a scientific consensus that a
substance is a carcinogen or reproductive toxicant. By creating a
science-based list, environmentalists hoped to eliminate political
considerations about regulatory impact from hazard identification
debates. However, many substances with sufficient scientific evidence
of carcinogenicity or reproductive toxicity may not be suitable targets for
a regulatory program. Targeting substances which are not in commercial
use or which are not amenable to applicable controls may waste
regulatory resources. In addition to the strength of toxicological
evidence, at least two criteria are relevant to the identification of "known
worst offenders" for a regulatory program: a substance's potential for
human exposure and its susceptibility to regulatory control.
To examine whether Proposition 65's science-based approach has
generated a suitable list of regulatory targets, this section categorizes
carcinogens and reproductive toxicants by their type of use 77 and by
the extent to which they are covered by existing federal pollution control
regulation. 78 In the absence of data on the volume of use or on the
extent of public exposure for the majority of listed substances, 79 the
76 YES CN 65, QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ABOUT PROPOSMON 65 (1986).
77 Chemical uses for listed compounds were ascertained from a review of IARC and
NTP supporting documentation and the Merck Index (1989). Many listed compounds
have more than one use, so chemical class totals exceed 100%. A spreadsheet of
listed Proposition 65 carcinogens and reproductive toxicants specifying chemical uses
and regulatory coverage is available from the author on request.
78 Regulatory coverage was ascertained by cross-correlating the Proposition 65 list
with the lists of chemicals affected by the following statutes: CAA: Clean Air Act, §
112 (list of hazardous air pollutants) CWA: Clean Water Act, § 304 (list of priority
pollutants) SDWA: Safe Drinking Water Act, § 300 (list of substances with current
or proposed national primary drinking water regulations) OSHA: Occupational Safety
and Health Act, § 6 (list of substances with permissible exposure limits) RCRA:
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, Subtitle C (list of hazardous waste
constituents) SARA: Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act, § 313 (list of
substances subject to information disclosure requirements).
79 See Pease et al., Regulating Carcinogensunder California'sProposition 65,
10 RISK ANAL. 255-271 (1990) for a presentation of available exposure data on the
most well-studied Proposition 65 carcinogens. The SARA Toxic Release Inventory,
which provides data on chemical emissions but not on exposure, includes only 30%
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type of chemical use serves as the best available indicator of potential
exposure. Federal regulatory coverage of classes of listed substances is
then examined to assess whether Proposition 65 has extended controls
to previously unaddressed but commercially significant compounds.
Carcinogens
Three hundred and seventy-six agents are listed as carcinogens
under Proposition 65. Table 3 classifies these into broad categories of
chemical use. The Proposition 65 list of carcinogens represents a
reasonably broad sample from the universe of chemicals. Two-fifths
(43%) of listed carcinogens are industrial substances; most are chemical
intermediates used in manufacturing although some are present in final
consumer products. Therapeutic drugs and food constituents each
comprise an additional fifth of the list. Twenty-two percent of listed
agents are prescription drugs, particularly anti-neoplastic agents.
Eighteen percent are compounds that occur in food; about half of these
are naturally occurring or the result of preparation and half are synthetic
additives or environmental contaminants. Fifteen percent of listed
chemicals are agricultural chemicals, primarily pesticides. Ten percent
are energy-related substances, primarily combustion by-products, and
10% are laboratory research compounds. An additional 10% are
chemicals associated witli various life style choices, particularly
smoking tobacco, drinking alcohol or using cosmetics. Two percent of
listed compounds are associated with the use of chlorine as a
disinfectant in water supplies or bleaching agent in industry.

of the 500 carcinogens and reproductive toxicants listed under Proposition 65. About
40% of listed carcinogens and 90% of listed reproductive toxicants are not covered.
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Table 3
Types of Use of Listed Proposition 65 Compounds
Type of Use
IndustrialSubstances
Dyes or dye intermediates
Inorganics
Solvents
Others used or produced in mfg.
Present in consumer products

Carcinogens
Z,= 161 [43%]
51
14
20
100
14

AgriculturalChemicals
Fungicide
Herbicide
Insecticide (pesticide)
Nematocide
Growth regulator

2=56[15%]

Energy-RelatedSubstances
Fuel
Combustion by-products
Fuel additives

2=39[10%1
6
29
4

Z=4 [3%]
0
3
1

ChlorinationBy-Products
LaboratoryResearch Compounds
Food Constituents
Natural
Mycotoxins
Preparation-related
Synthetic additives
Environmental contaminants

6[2%]
37[10%]
Z = 66 [18%]
6
4
20
16
20

1 [1%]
0
2 = 7 [6%1
0
0
0
0
7

Medicines
Prescription drugs
Over-the-counter drugs

Z,=81 [22%]
79
2

2=102 [80%]
1002

Life Style Associated
Tobacco-related
Alcohol-related
Other drugs
Cosmetics
Radionuclides(as a class)

2,=38 [16%]
25
5
0
10
1 [0%]

Z= 7 [6%]
3
1
3
0
0

16
7
28
5
2

Reproductive Toxicants
Z= 12 [9%]
0
2
5
6
4

Z,=15 [12%1]
7
3
8
1
1
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Figure 2 indicates the percentage of listed carcinogens that are
covered by federal programs focused on controlling the quality of air,
water, land or the workplace. In general, identified carcinogens appear
to be underregulated: the vast majority of listed carcinogens are not
covered under existing statutes (Figure 2(a)). 80 The extent of coverage
increases if one examines the chemical use classes which are targeted by
conventional regulatory programs. Coverage under most statutes
increases for carcinogenic industrial substances (Figure 2(b)),
agricultural chemicals (Figure 2(c)), energy-related substances (Figure
2(d)) and chlorination by-products (Figure 2(e)). Carcinogens that are
outside the traditional purview of environmental agencies, like
laboratory research compounds (Figure 2(f)), medicines (Figure 2(h))
and substances associated with life style choices (Figure 2(i)) are less
81
frequently addressed.

80 The distribution of coverage under different statutes illustrates that there is an
inverse relationship between the scope of regulatory coverage and the stringency of
regulatory requirements. Pease, The Role of Cancer Risk in the Regulation of
Industrial Pollution, RISK ANAL. (in press). The largest percentages (35-45%) of
identified carcinogens are affected by the least stringent requirements, such as
information disclosure or handling rules. Smaller percentages (25% or less) are
covered by standards limiting potential human exposure in the workplace or through
other environmental media.
81 Food constituents, which are not a principal target of the statutes examined in
this analysis, are covered extensively (Figure 2(g)) because of the large proportion of
n-nitroso compounds and synthetic environmental contaminants on the Proposition
65 list (both are also regulated as industrial substances).
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Figure 2
82
Percentages of Listed Chemicals Covered by Federal Programs
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82 See legend for Figure 1, supra.
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Approximately half of listed Proposition 65 carcinogens may not be
suitable regulatory targets. At least 15% of listed carcinogens are no
longer commercially used in the U.S.; this includes about half of the
listed agricultural chemicals. An additional 30% of listed carcinogens
have extremely limited potential for widespread human exposure
because their used is restricted to medical or research settings. Listed
drugs in particular are unlikely to be discharged to drinking water and
are exempt from Proposition 65 warning requirements.
In spite of the inclusion of substantial proportions of irrelevant
compounds, Proposition 65 has clearly extended regulatory controls to a
larger absolute number of chemicals with the potential for widespread
human exposure than any federal statute. Its discharge ban, for
example, affects four times as many carcinogenic industrial substances
than are regulated under the Clean Water Act. In additional, although
significant proportions of listed industrial chemicals are covered by
major federal environmental statutes, these programs rarely address
exposures through consumer products, which are a principal focus of
Proposition 65's warning requirements. 83
Reproductive Toxicants
One hundred and twenty-seven compounds are listed as
developmental or reproductive toxicants under Proposition 65. Table 3
also classifies these compounds into broad categories of chemical use.
In contrast to carcinogens, the Proposition 65 list of reproductive
toxicants is dominated by one type of chemical use. The overwhelming
majority (80%) of listed reproductive toxicants are therapeutic drugs. 84
83 Excellent examples are provided by methylene chloride and para-dichlorobenzene.
While these chemicals are targeted by some federal regulatory programs, important
efforts to reduce consumer exposures through paint strippers and air fresheners have

been conducted using the warning requirements of Proposition 65. ATTORNEY
GENERAL, PROPOSITION 65 L-TIGATION SUMMARY (1991).
84 Listed drugs can be further categorized into anti-neoplastics (20), antibiotics (16),
hormones (13), benzodiazepine tranquilizers (7), anti-convulsant drugs (4) and
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All other chemical use classes represent about 10% or less of the total
list. Twelve percent are agricultural chemicals, 9% are industrial
substances, 6% are food constituents (all chlorinated hydrocarbon
environmental contaminants), 6% are associated with tobacco, alcohol
or other drugs, and 3% are energy-related substances.
Figure 2 illustrates the percentage of listed reproductive toxicants
that are covered by federal programs focused on controlling the quality
of air, water, land or the workplace. Reproductive toxicants appear to be
addressed even less frequently than carcinogens (Figure 2(a)), but this
reflects the predominance of listed drugs, which are rarely covered by
major environmental statutes (Figure 2(h)). Focusing on the chemical
use classes that have been the target of conventional regulatory
programs (Figure 2(b-e)), reproductive toxicants are generally
addressed as frequently or more frequently than listed carcinogens. It is
important to note that federal regulatory coverage rarely address
exposures through consumer products, a principal focus of Proposition
85
65's warning requirements.
The apparently extensive regulatory coverage is largely attributable
to the small number of substances in widespread commercial use that
have been identified as reproductive toxicants under Proposition 65.
Just 12 chemicals with industrial uses have been listed. Several
ubiquitous environmental contaminants (lead, mercury, PCBs, TCDD)
have been historically important regulatory targets. Four other
commercially significant chemicals (carbon disulfide, ethylene glycol
monoethyl and monomethyl ether and toluene) have been addressed by
most environmental statutes. Just 15 agricultural chemicals have been
listed. Use of many of these pesticides has been virtually eliminated
(e.g., aminopterin, cyhexatin, DBCP, dinoseb, hexachlorobenzene,
kepone, warfarin). 8 6 Only a few are widely used (e.g., benomyl,
dermatologic agents (2).
85 An excellent example is provided by lead. While the compound is targeted by all
federal regulatory programs, important efforts to reduce consumer exposures through
food, wine and ceramics have been conducted using the warning provisions of
Proposition 65. ATroRNEY GmERAL, supranote 83.
3 RISK -Issues in Health &Safety 127 [Spring 1992]

bromoxynil, cyanazine, carbon disulfide, ethylene oxide).87
Most listed reproductive toxicants are not suitable regulatory targets
for Proposition 65. The drugs which dominate the list are already
subject to more stringent FDA regulation. While there is widespread
exposure to a number of drugs, 8 8 usage is unlikely to be affected by
Proposition 65's regulatory requirements. 89 Less than one-quarter of
listed reproductive toxicants are appropriate targets for regulatory
provisions aimed at eliminating drinking water contamination and
reducing public exposure generally.
Conclusions
The Tradeoffs of List-BasedRegulation
The size of the Proposition 65 list is itself an indication of the Act's
capacity to reform the status quo of toxics regulation. By ensuring that
all identified carcinogens and reproductive toxicants become subject to
its provisions almost automatically, Proposition 65 has precluded the
time-consuming, case-by-case debates which have plagued efforts to
86 EPA, SUSPENDED, CANCELLED ANDREsmCrED PEsTcrDEs (1990).
87 CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF FOOD AND AGRICULTURE (CDFA), PESTICIDE USE
REPORTANNUAL 1988 (1990).
88 A number of listed antibiotics (e.g., doxyeycline and tetracycline), anticonvulsants (e.g., phenytoin) and benzodiazepines (e.g., librium and valium) are
frequently prescribed, R. TALLARIDA, MPD 1985: MOST PRESCRIBED DRUGS 1985
(1985), perhaps at doses of reproductive concern. Friedman et al., PotentialHuman
Teratogenicity of Frequently PrescribedDrugs, 75 OBSTET. GYNECOL. 594-599
(1990). Two listed drugs (aspirin and reinols) are available over the counter. Despite
significant federal controls, there is widespread abuse of a number of listed drugs,
both illegal (anabolic steroids, cocaine) and legal (alcohol, tobacco, toluene).
89 Proposition 65's discharge ban is generally irrelevant for listed drugs. As
currently implemented, Proposition 65's warning requirements for therapeutic drugs
are less stringent and less informative than required federal warnings about
reproductive toxicity. Pease, supra note 42. Proposition 65's most significant
impact in regard to drugs has involved requiring warnings about the reproductive
effects of alcohol and aspirin earlier than mandated federally. The law may also result
in occupational warnings in pharmaceutical manufacturing that would not be required
under existing federal laws.
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extend the regulatory coverage of most federal laws. No other
regulatory program is based on such a large list of potential targets or
has established as many regulatory levels as quickly. 90 Virtually the
entire spectrum of political participants in the Proposition 65 debate
seem to agree that the Act has resulted in a far more rapid assessment of
carcinogens and reproductive toxicants than has occurred under other
state and federal legislation. 9 1
The politically charged effort to create a list of regulatory targets
inevitably involves significant tradeoffs between extending regulatory
coverage, facilitating efficient regulation and ensuring scientific
consistency. Proposition 65's approach to hazard identification was
designed to correct the poor performance of traditional regulatory
programs. Lists of Clean Water Act (CWA) priority pollutants and
Clean Air Act (CAA) hazardous air pollutants, for example, are
substantially shorter than the Proposition 65 list and clearly do not
address all commercially significant identified hazards. While these
federal lists exemplify substantial flaws in the existing hazard
identification process,9 2 they also reflect an effort to focus monitoring
and control requirements on just those chemicals which are likely to be
discharged into an environmental medium.
90 Pease et al., supranote 79.

91 Corash and Shapiro, California'sProposition65: An IsolatedExperiment or a
TroublingPrecedent? in CLEAN WATER AND Toxic WASTE: AT WHAT COST FOR

WHAT GAIN? (1989); W. NORTH, RISK ASSESSMENT UNDER PROPOSITION 65: A
PERSPECTIVEFROM THE SCMNCE ADVISORY PANEL (1989) (proceedings of the 82nd

Annual Meeting of the Air and Waste Management Association, Anaheim, CA);
Roe, Barking up the Right Tree: Recent Progressin Focusing the Toxics Issue, 13

(oL. J. ENVIRON. LAW 275-283 (1988).

92 Under both federal statutes, the development of lists which specify targets for

regulatory control has been incomplete and very time-consuming. The 126 priority
pollutants which are the focus of CWA regulation represent only 25% of the most
frequently occurring chemicals in wastewater from industries and publicly owned
treatment works, but the list has not been modified since 1977. Slow progress with
identifying hazardous air pollutants under the original Section 112 of the CAA
recently stimulated Congress to legislatively expand its list of regulatory targets from
7 to 189 compounds. Robinson & Pease, FromHealth-Based to Technology-Based
Standardsfor HazardousAir Pollutants,81 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1518-1523 (1991).
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Compared with most environmental legislation, Proposition 65
strikes a different balance between extent of coverage and applicability
of regulatory requirements. Rather than restrict its coverage to chemicals
likely to be affected by its provisions, it adopts an inclusive approach to
hazard identification. To avoid the political debates likely to accompany
considerations of regulatory relevance, the law specifies that sufficient
scientific evidence is the only appropriate criterion for selecting targets.
As a consequence, about 45% of listed carcinogens and 75% of listed
reproductive toxicants are not substantially affected by Proposition 65's
warning requirements or discharge ban. This regulatory irrelevance can
occur because a substance has already been banned (e.g., most listed
pesticides), because it has no important commercial use (e.g., laboratory
research chemicals), because its use is controlled by more stringent
requirements (e.g., therapeutic drugs) or because its use cannot be
affected by Proposition 65 requirements (e.g., illegal drugs).
The extent of administrative inefficiency introduced by this inclusive
approach to hazard identification varies with the specific regulatory
requirements of Proposition 65. Restricting the application of its
discharge ban to chemicals likely to be released to drinking water would
reduce monitoring requirements, facilitate permitting activity and
simplify enforcement. 9 3 For Proposition 65's warning requirements,
there is less of a need to focus on a short list of regulatory targets. The
burden of providing warnings about exposures to listed chemicals is not
assigned to an administrative agency but is instead spread among
businesses which have better access to information about chemical use.
While compliance with Proposition 65's warning requirements could be
better assured if a regulatory agency monitored chemical exposures, the
law provides significant incentives for businesses to police themselves.
93 As of January 1992, there had been no effort to enforce Proposition 65's
discharge ban. Citizen suits have been hampered by the absence of monitoring data
on most listed substances. A principal reason for this inaction is the substantial
administrative resources required to extend the State's water quality permit system to
so many new chemicals.
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Important tradeoffs between coverage, efficiency and consistency
have been obscured throughout the Proposition 65 listing debate as
parties have appealed to science to justify their policy preferences.
Environmentalists sought to increase the number of substances subject
to preventive regulation by restricting listing decisions to scientific
considerations: is there sufficient evidence of hazard? is there a scientific
consensus that a substance is a hazard? The actual goal of this emphasis
on science was not, however, to guarantee that listed substances shared
consistent evidence, but rather to eliminate considerations of regulatory
impact from the hazard identification phase of risk regulation. By
combining hazard identifications conducted by different organizations
without specifying a uniform threshold of sufficient evidence,
Proposition 65 values extending regulatory coverage over ensuring
scientific consistency. While this tradeoff has not had a major impact on
listed carcinogens, it allowed the State to introduce a double standard for
identifying developmental and reproductive toxicants. Substantial
evidence of reproductive toxicity (including both human and animal
data) has been required to list industrial substances, but much less
evidence (including chemical similarity alone) has been accepted as
sufficient for listing drugs.
Opponents of Proposition 65 have also maintained that "science
[should] be given the preeminent role" in the implementation
process. 9 4 The regulated community and the Deukmejian
Administration sought to minimize the law's regulatory impact by
appealing to scientific considerations in order to delay hazard
identification. "Sound science" justified shortening the list to cover only
toxicants with human evidence and adopting substance-by-substance
review procedures. As with environmentalists, the Administration's
emphasis on science obscured the political balance it wanted to strike
between regulatory coverage, efficiency and consistency. To prevent the
development of an extensive list of new regulatory targets, listing was
94 Kizer et al., Sound Science in the Implementation of Public Policy: A Case
Report on California's Proposition65, 260 JAMA 951-955 (1988).
3 RISK- Issues in Health &Safety 127 [Spring 1992]

focused on substances unlikely to be affected by Proposition 65's
requirements and scientific concerns were emphasized at the expense of
accelerated hazard identification.
Recommendations to Improve the Proposition65 Listing Process
Although the Proposition 65 list of carcinogens and reproductive
toxicants has now grown to include virtually all hazard identifications
made by national and international organizations, the Act's mandate "to
engage in a diligent, thorough, and continuing search for additional
chemicals" 95 remains unfulfilled. Throughout the implementation of
Proposition 65, the listing process has exhibited only a limited capacity
to select chemicals for evaluation based on potential health risks or to
evaluate chemicals not already identified as hazards by other
organizations.
The failure to establish an effective system for assessing
unaddressed toxic chemicals can be attributed to limitations in the Act's
original statutory scheme as well as to the State's administrative
implementation of the law. Proposition 65 itself does not mandate any
procedure for selecting candidate toxicants for listing. 96 Its emphasis
on scientific consensus helped shape a listing process that selects
candidate chemicals based on sufficiency of evidence rather than on
public health concerns. 9 7 To prevent the law from imposing new
95 AFL-CIO v. Deukmejian, 212 Cal. App. 3d at 440.
96 Earlier environmental policy proposals to prioritize chemicals for testing and

toxicological evaluation by presence in drinking water or by volume of use
(embodied legislatively in Lloyd Connelly's Assembly Bill 2582: The Pure Drinking
Water and Safe Chemical Act of 1985) were not incorporated into the Proposition 65
initiative.
97 Once the SAP completed its review of chemicals included on Proposition 65's
"minimum" list of carcinogens, additional compounds were considered on the basis of
extent of scientific evidence. Beginning with substances which had been classified by
the EPA Carcinogen Assessment Group (4/22/88) and IARC (9/16/88), the SAP
moved on to compounds identified by the NTP as having three or four positive
animal studies (4/14/89) and then to those having two positive studies (4/6/90). The
SAP's listing agenda for reproductive toxicants was initially determined by an
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regulatory burdens on the business community, the Deukmejian
Administration limited the listing agenda to known hazards and
continually postponed prioritizing unassessed chemicals for evaluation
98
by the SAP.
informal agreement among members of the Reproductive Subpanel to focus on those
substances with sufficient human evidence.
Efforts to address chemicals on the basis of public concern have been relatively
limited. The most extensive effort to bring new chemicals before the SAP for
consideration focused on pesticides. Concerned "about the shortness of the Prop 65
list in regard to carcinogenic and teratogenic pesticides," the National Farm Workers
Health Group recommended 121 possibly carcinogenic and 66 possibly teratogenic
pesticides for review to the CHWA. Letter from M. Moses to W. Kilgore, SAP
Chair (July 14, 1988). Less than one-sixth of the carcinogens were subsequently
evaluated by the SAP. Focusing on 18 pesticides and herbicides that EPA had
designated as having sufficient evidence of carcinogenicity in animals, SAP, Dec. 16,
1988, the SAP considered several pesticides (e.g., lactofen) that were neither
registered nor used in California. SAP, Dec. 16, 1988, at 42. Less than one-third of
the teratogens were subsequently evaluated by the SAP.
98 For carcinogens, no state resources have ever been devoted to prioritizing
candidate chemicals for listing under Proposition 65.
The history of attempts to develop a prioritization scheme for reproductive
toxicants is indicative of the state's efforts to control the listing process. The absence
of established authoritative lists stimulated early interest in establishing priorities for
SAP consideration, given the large universe of chemicals with at least some evidence
of reproductive toxicity. At a meeting in April 1988, the SAP Reproductive
Subpanel specified a list of 12 compounds as priorities for future consideration based
on the extent of scientific data and the potential for human exposure. SAP Subpanel,
April 14, 1988. To supplement the SAP effort, CDHS prepared a paper which
prioritized compounds on the basis of available chemical emissions and use data. J.
VANDENBERG et al., THE USE OF AN EVALUATED ToxicrrY DATA BASE IN SETING
PRIORITIES FOR ASSESSMENT OF REPRODUCIVE ToxwcANTs (1989) (proceedings of the
82nd Annual Meeting of the Air and Waste Management Association, Anaheim,
CA). The CHWA, however, ignored these schemes and insisted that other chemicals
have a higher priority for listing consideration.
Maintaining that the SAP should focus on chemicals "with sufficient evidence of
reproductive toxicity in people," memo from S. Book to H. Collins, CDHS (Jan.
11, 1990) (concerning prioritization of reproductive toxicants), the CHWA proceeded
to focus SAP evaluations on drugs (e.g., 4 prescription antibiotics on the SAP's
October 1989 agenda). When SAP member Diana Pettiti stated that "in looking over
the list of potential reproductive toxicants that we are to consider here today, it
doesn't sort of match with my notion of what are serious potential teratogens," SAP
Chair Dorothy Burk explained that the Reproductive Subpanel "prioritized a number
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Several recommendations can be made to improve future hazard
identification efforts:
*The State should support the creation of an independent
chemical review process that can make unique contributions
to hazard identification. While the Proposition 65 listing
methods which ensure that the law automatically covers
hazards identified by other organizations have been
implemented, the State has not fulfilled Proposition 65's
mandate to conduct de novo hazard identification. There are
two major sources of toxicological data on compounds that
have not been assessed by other authoritative organizations
of chemicals which, in our opinion, needed to be addressed. Some of the ones you see
on here were not ones that we prioritized. They were put on by others." SAP, Oct.

20, 1989, at 33-34.
The SAP never regained control of iis agenda. Only half of the compounds
originally prioritized by the SAP have subsequently been evaluated and just 3 have

been identified as reproductive toxicants. Consideration of the Reproductive
Subpanel's number one priority (environmental tobacco smoke) has been continually
postponed. (The other priority chemicals that have not yet been evaluated include:
cadmium, arsenic, caffeine, styrene, xylene, benzene, thiouracils and anesthetic gases
(nitrous oxide). SAP Subpanel, Feb. 22, 1989.)
After the SAP's sole expert on reproductive toxicity insisted that "the more
important task before the Panel is the order of consideration of non-drug chemicals,"
CHWA essentially took over the listing process for reproductive toxicants,
automatically listing FDA-rated drugs and proposing virtually no compounds for
SAP review.
Recently, the CHWA has acknowledged that the current listing process for
reproductive toxicants could be considered "arbitrary" and initiated the development of
a "clear, predictable scheme to identify chemicals of concern." Memo from S. Book
to H. Collins, CDHS (Jan. 11, 1990) (concerning prioritization of reproductive
toxicants). CDHS developed an elaborate scheme for selecting chemicals for
consideration on the basis of several different approaches, ranging from expert
identification to cross-referencing available toxicity data with human exposure
databases. Donald et al., Prioritizing Candidate ReproductivelDevelopmental
Toxicantsfor Evaluation,REPROD. TOXICoL. (1991) (in press). As of January 1992,
however, the State has not used the CDHS priority candidate list of 42 industrial and
agricultural chemicals to revive the Proposition 65 listing process. While two
priorities (PCBs and toluene) have been listed as a result of SAP evaluations that
began before the scheme was proposed and one (ribavirin) has been listed as a result
of FDA labeling requirements, none of the remaining chemicals have been placed on
the SAP agenda for consideration.
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which could be evaluated: public databases compiling
bioassay results 99 and regulatory agency files containing
100
premarket test results.
- De novo hazard identification efforts should principally
focus on evaluating reproductive toxicants for listing under
Proposition 65. While existing federal programs have
established a process to screen and test commercially

significant compounds and to identify potential carcinogens,
no such effort is currently focused on reproductive toxicants.
Since new carcinogen identifications conducted by
authoritative bodies are automatically incorporated into the
Proposition 65 list, there are only a few remaining sources
of carcinogenicity data requiring evaluation (e.g., pesticide
test results). In contrast, there are significant opportunities to

contribute to reproductive hazard identification since these
toxicants are generally unaddressed by existing state and
federal regulatory systems. 10 1

99 The Carcinogen Potency Database, Gold et al., Third Chronological
Supplement to the CarcinogenPotency Database:StandardizedResults of Animal
Bioassays Published Through December 1986 and by the National Toxicology
Program Through June 1987, 84 ENVIRON. HEALTH PERSPECT. 215-285 (1990),
compiles published bioassay results on potential carcinogens. The Registry of Toxic
Effects of Chemical Substances and the Hazardous Substances Data Bank contain
extensive summaries of reproductive toxicity test results.
100 A considerable amount of unassessed data exists in the files of regulatory
agencies. CaIEPA's Department of Pesticide Regulation, for example, has assembled
a large database which includes results from two-year carcinogenicity bioassays and
reproductive toxicity studies on a variety of agricultural chemicals that have not been
evaluated by authoritative organizations.

To date, California regulatory agencies have generally not sought to bring
chemicals into the Proposition 65 listing process. CHWA attempts to solicit
nominations of priority chemicals from agencies have identified only a few chemicals

for SAP evaluation. Since the passage of Proposition 65, for example, CDFA
nominated only one pesticide for listing as a carcinogen (captafol, SAP, Sept. 16,
1988) and three for listing as reproductive toxicants (cycloheximide, cyhexatin and

dinoseb, SAP, Dec. 16, 1988).
101 GAO, supranote 5.
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I - Chemicals selected as candidates for listing under
Proposition 65 should be prioritized for evaluation on the
basis of potential for significant human exposure and
relevance of the regulatory control requirements of
Proposition 65.102 It is imperative to develop more effective
selection methods than alphabetic order (previously used by
the SAP with most IARC and NTP carcinogens) or
anecdotal scientific judgment (used by the SAP with its
initial list of reproductive toxicants). There are a number of
sources of data on chemical use and exposure which have
not generally been used to guide the selection of candidate
chemicals. 10 3 Early assessment of whether a chemical is
likely to be affected by Proposition 65's requirements can
avoid wasting resources on listing irrelevant substances
(e.g., illegal drugs).
- The SAP's institutional capacity to conduct independent
hazard identification should be substantially strengthened.
The SAP should be allowed control over its own agenda and
provided with sufficient resources to carry on de novo
chemical evaluations. Quarterly SAP meetings should be
reinstituted to provide adequate time for data reviews. To
facilitate Proposition 65's unique mandate to identify
reproductive toxicants, the Subpanel on Reproductive
Toxicity should be reestablished.
- The SAP should address science policy questions
associated with the Proposition 65 listing process, but limit
102

Consistent with the State's effort to focus hazard identification efforts on
substances already covered by regulation, the State's current fifteen top priorities for
evaluation as reproductive toxicants, Donald et al., supra note 98, have already been
listed as carcinogens under Proposition 65. Listing them as reproductive toxicants
will have minimal regulatory impact, requiring only supplemental warning language.
The State's existing priority list of reproductive toxicants should be modified to
focus on substances that are not already covered by Proposition 65, unless regulatory
levels based on reproductive effects are likely to be lower than those based on
carcinogenicity.
103 These include the EPA's Chemicals on Reporting Rules Database and CalEPA's
pesticide use inventories. CDFA, supra note 87.
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its consideration of risk assessment or regulatory policy
issues. Listing decisions are the only statutorily mandated
function of the Governor's "qualified experts" under
Proposition 65. In the past, the Panel's attention has been
diverted to other issues in order to delay the hazard
104
identification process.
One major outstanding hazard identification issue involves whether
listing decisions should emphasize scientific or regulatory consistency.
Is it more important to ensure that all listed substances are supported by
consistent scientific evidence or to ensure that all substances covered by
a Proposition 65 listing method are listed? With carcinogens, the State
has subjected substances which could be identified on the basis of
authoritative bodies or regulatory labeling requirements to a sufficiency
of evidence test and refused to list many commercially significant
compounds. With reproductive toxicants, the State has avoided
evaluating supporting evidence and listed many irrelevant therapeutic
compounds automatically because of FDA labeling requirements.
To encourage a more consistent approach to listing decisions, the
SAP must explicitly address the issue of what constitutes sufficient
evidence to justify preventive regulation under Proposition 65. The
Panel can (a) reassert the relatively high standard of evidence
represented by current SAP hazard identification criteria and insist that
all procedurally-based listing decisions be subjected to a sufficiency of
evidence test; or (b) revise its standards to accept that lesser amounts of
evidence are sufficient to identify a substance as "known to the State" to
cause cancer or reproductive toxicity. Substances with relatively limited
104 As part of its strategy to limit de novo hazard identification, the Deukmejian

Administration focused SAP meetings on reviewing Proposition 65 risk assessments
rather than chemical data. Cursory SAP reviews did not substantially modify the
scientific content of most risk assessments, but they did monopolize the SAP agenda
(on average,,six 50 page documents were presented and discussed at each meeting after
the fall of 1988). Cancer policy issues are more appropriately addressed within the
process California has established to modify its Guidelines for Chemical Carcinogen
Risk Assessment, relying on expert committees with substantially broader expertise
than the Proposition 65 SAP.
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evidence have been listed as a result of Proposition 65's procedural
requirements. 10 5 The Panel must consider whether these listings have
established a new minimum threshold of evidence that should be applied
in future chemical evaluations. Given the preventive goals of
Proposition 65, it may be appropriate to extend its scope beyond
traditional "known" toxicants to suspect compounds with more limited
evidence of hazard. 106
Proposition 65 provides an interesting model for reforming hazard
identification in environmental regulation. It has successfully increased
the number of carcinogens and reproductive toxicants affected by
regulatory requirements. Its dramatic extension of regulatory coverage
has occurred at the expense of both regulatory relevance and scientific
consistency. Moreover, political concerns about automatically
expanding the scope of regulation have prevented a major effort to
evaluate unassessed compounds. The State's failure to contribute many
new hazard identifications does not reflect a scientific determination that
all potential chemical carcinogens and reproductive hazards have been
discovered, but is rather a consequence of the political importance of
listing under Proposition 65. In the future, the challenge in
implementing Proposition 65 will involve establishing an effective
process for selecting and evaluating new compounds.

105 Some FDA-labeled therapeutic compounds have been identified as reproductive
toxicants on the basis of membership in a chemical class, structure-activity
relationships, limited bioassay results or epidemiological case reports.
106 The SAP should consider how it will proceed with carcinogen identification after
all chemicals with lifetime bioassay data have been reviewed. In particular, the SAP
should decide whether it will adopt recent proposals to identify carcinogens on the

basis of short-term test results alone. Ashby & Marrod, Detection of Human
Carcinogens,352 NATURE 185-186 (1991).

